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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

LEROY SCHULTZ,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
No. 15134

-vJOSE QUINTANA,
Defendant-Appellant.

NATURE OF THE CASE
Plaintiff sues for recovery of damages for personal
injuries caused by defendant's negligence sustained while
traveling on a right-of-way.
DISPOSITION IN

T~E

LOWER COURT

After trial on the merits an eight-person jury in the
Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake County,
State of Utah, with the Honorable Ernest F. Baldwin, Jr.
presiding, found in favor of the plaintiff.
NATURE OF RELIEF SOUGHT
Plaintiff-Respondent seeks affirmation of the Lower
Court's judgment.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Appellant, Jose Quintana, was defendant in a personal
injury suit tried in the Third Judicial District Court on March
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16 and 17, 1977.

Plaintiff, Leroy Schultz, alleged that

appellant was negligent in the erroneous placement of c:ertai:.
survey stakes on defendant's property, over one of which
plaintiff claimed that he tripped, sustaining injuries
allegedly disabled him for 88 days.

whi~

Plaintiff sought to reco·.

special damages for medical treatment and lost wages as a rai:
switchman in the amount of $6,739.19.

Plaintiff also claimed

general damages for pain and suffering in the amount of
$40,000.00.
The survey stake, over which plaintiff claimed that
he stumbled, was allegedly driven on or near a right-of-way
adjoining

the property line of defendant's property at

2422 Lake Street, Salt Lake City, Utah.

Appellant had receivs

notice of his successful bid on the property August 21, 1974.
Plaintiff had a rightful easement in a coarsely graveled
north-south right-of-way abutting defendant's property, by
which right-of-way he gained access to parking and a garage
at the rear of his property at 2420 Lake Street.

Appell~t

responded in an interrogatory that he drove the survey stakes
or about August 24, 1974, in such a line as to identify a~
preserve his neighbor's right-of-way which he believed to be
between the west boundaries of the Lake Street lots and t~
east boundary of the property he acquired from the state. f

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-2-

stakes were allegedly installed in an erroneous attempt to
delineate the property line on which a fence was to be built
later between defendant's property and plaintiff's right-ofway on the correct alignment as determined by a subsequent
professional survey.
On the night of the alleged injury, plaintiff had
backed his car south over the gravel driveway turning west onto
a second east-west paved public right-of-way that would lead
him to Lake Street and thence to work.

Plaintiff stopped

his car on the paved right-of-way and in the dark rushed
to his residence to get his railroad lantern.

The plaintiff

stumbled and fell over a corner survey stake sustaining injuries
to his shoulder, back, ankle and teeth.

Plaintiff brought

this action to recover damages' sustained in that fall.

rhe jury

on special verdict found the defendant-appellant 75 percent
negligent and awarded damages to the plaintiff in the amount of

$3,342.26 plus costs.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
LANDOWNERS OWE A DUTY OF REASONABLE CARE
TO USERS OF ADJACENT RIGHTS-OF-WAY.
Plaintiff's status at the time of the incident was
that of a traveler or user of a highway.

As such the instruction

to the jury given by the Lower Court was correct.

The Court

said:
"The right of a person to use and enjoy ~is
property is qualified by a duty to exercise
reasonable care for the safety of others who
may bypass
by Law
his
Sponsored
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Library.property.
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The duty of an owner of property adjacent
to a right-of-way extends not only to the
user of the right-of-way but also to those who
reasonably stray a short distance from the
right-of-way for a casual purpose.
The owner of land abutting the right-ofway may be negligent creating an unsafe
condition thereon.
An unsafe condition as that term is used in
these instructions, means a condition on
the land in question involving an unreasonable
risk of injury to person properly using such
area."
The complained of stake was on or near the boundary
of defendant's property.

It is therefore clear that plaintif'

was also on or near the right-of-way at the time of the
accident.

Plaintiff's testimony shows that plaintiff never

left his lawful right-of-way and that in fact the defendant h:
erroneously placed the survey stakes not on the boundary line,,
in the plaintiff's rightful right-of-way.

The authorities a:

clear as to both the status and duty owed plaintiff.
In the case of Marsh v. City of Sacramento,
2d 721, 274,P.2d 434, 438

127

c.:

(1954), the California Supreme Cour:

approvingly quoted language from Prosser, Law of Torts, page
352-3.

It said:
. "The privilege of a possessor of land to make
use of his property is qualified by a due regard
for the interests of others who may be affected
by it.
He is under the obligation to make only
a reasonable use of his property, which causes no
unreasonable harm to those in the vicinity.
A large number of cases have involved
.
danger to the adjacent highway. The public
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right of passage carries with it an obligation
upon the occupiers of abutting land to use
reasonable care to see that the passage is
safe. They are not required to maintain or
repair the highway itself, but they will
be liable for any unreasonable risk to those
who are on it ••• The obligation extends also
to any conditions, such as an excavation next
to the street, which are dangerous to those who
use it. The status of a user of the highway
has been extended to those who stray a few feet
from it inadvertently or in an emergency, or
even intentionally for some casual purpose."
The same proposition is also supported by many other
jurisdictions, see, e.g. Misterek v. Washington Mineral
Products, Inc., 85 Wash. 2d 166, 531 P.2d 805, 807 (1974);
Gaylord Container Corp. v. Miley,

230 F.2d 177, 182 (5th

Cir. 1956); De Ark v. Nashville Stone Setting Corp., 38 Tenn.
App. 678, 279

s.w.

2d 518, 521 (1955), and the Restatement

of Torts, 2d, Explanatory Notes Section 368, comment e.
As such the trial court properly instructed the jury
on the duty which the defendant-landowner owed to plaintiff.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY REFUSED DEFENDANT 1 S_ MOTION FOR A DIRECTED VERDICT.
In Morby v. Rogers, 122 Utah 540, 252 P.2d 231, 232
(1953) this Court outlined the basis for granting a directed
verdict by saying that such a verdict would only be granted when
reasonable minds could draw only one conclusion on the basis
of the facts.

This situation is clearly not present in the

instant case.
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POINT III
THE INADVERTENT MENTIONING OF INSURANCE BY
PLAINTIFF'S COUNSEL DID NOT PREJUDICE THE
JURY SO AS TO REQUIRE A NEW TRIAL.
In Robinson v. Hreinson, 17 Utah 2d 261, 409 P.2d:
(1965), this Court said the following:
"In applying the law to the everyday affairs
of life it is the duty of the courts to be
as practical and realistic as possible and
to keep abreast of changing times.
For
that reason ••• they are not nearly so apprehensiw
that mention of this subject in the presence
of the jury will be prejudicial as they formerly
were. We do not depart from our former
position: that the question of insurance is
immaterial and should not be injected into the
trial; and that it is the duty of both counsel
and Court to guard against it.
However, the mere
mention of the subject does not necessarily
in all instances compel the conclusion that
it so prejudices the jury that a fair trial
cannot be carried out."
This Court further clarified this point in the case of OWens
Trucking v. Stewart, 29 Utah 2d 353, 509 P.2d 821, 823.

Tu

that case insurance was mentioned twice, once by the plaintif'
attorney after the Court had instructed a witness to refrain
mentioning insurance.

1

Nonetheless, this Court upheld the ru;.i

of the trial Court that an instruction to the jury to disrega
the statements was sufficient to correct any alleged prejudic
Certainly in the present case, ,where the court a~r
counsel and instructed the jury to disregard the statement,
this Court should again rule that insufficient prejudice w~
present to preclude a fair trial.
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POINT IV
IN THE ALTERNATIVE TO POINT III, DEFENDANT'S
COUNSEL WAIVED HIS RIGHT TO ASK FOR A NEW
TRIAL BY FAILING TO OBJECT IN A TIMELY
MANNER.
It is a well established rule that a timely objection
is required to reserve a right to appeal, see, e.g. State v.
Thompson, 58 Utah 291; 149 P.2d 161, i64; Annot., 45 A.L.R. 2d 318.
Defendant's counsel clearly decided that the statements of
plaintiff's counsel did not prejudice the jury and consciously
decided to proceed with the trial rather than object.
Appellant now requests the application of Rule 60(b),
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and thereby seeks to obtain
relief from the Lower Court's judgment on the basis that
his former counsel committed excusable neglect.

The thrust of

Rule 60(b) is to relieve persons from the omissions of
their counsel which eliminates their right to a day in court.
Defendant-Appellant had his day in court and followed the
decision of his counsel to proceed with the trial.

The conscious

and reasoned decision of one's attorney, in an area calling
for such a decision, is clearly not a case for the application of
Rule 60(b).
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CONCLUSION
The defendant-appellant owed a duty to the
plaintiff-respondent as a user of a right-of-way and the
verdict of the jury in the lower court should be affirmed,
Respectfully submitted,
STEPHEN M. HARMSEN
350 South 400 East, #G-1
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

foregoi~ I

I hereby certify that two copies of the
Brief of Respondent were served on Phil L. Hansen, PHIL L. !
HANSEN AND ASSOCIATES, attorneys for the defendant-appellant,!
250 East Broadway, Suite 100, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111,
I
this /,--day of September, 1977. ~
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